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This paper proposes an econometric model to identify unobserved consumer types in the credit market.
Consumers choose different amounts of loan because of differences in their time or risk preferences
(types). Thus, the unconditional probability of default is modeled using a mixture density combining
a type-conditioning default variable with a type-determining random variable. The model is estimated
using individual-level consumer credit card information. The parameter estimates and statistical tests
support this kind of specification. Furthermore, the model produces better out-of-sample predictions
on the probability of default than traditional models; hence, it provides evidence of the existence of
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Several economic theories have long suggested the existence of different yet 
unobserved types of individuals. In this line of research, theorists focus on mechanisms that 
may be useful in distinguishing these types. For example, in the classical signaling game of 
the job market (Spence 1973), there are multiple types of workers, some of which are more 
productive than others. Since the types can not be observed, each worker’s level of 
education is used as a signal to reveal his/her productivity. However, few empirical studies 
have either documented the existence of the unobserved types among individuals and/or the 
economic significance of identifying these types. To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
that provides an econometric method directly derived from a theoretical equilibrium model 
to empirically identify the unobserved individual types. Moreover, it shows that identifying 
the types results in significant economic benefits. 
This paper presents two main contributions. First, the paper extends Milde and 
Riley’s (1988) model of the consumer loan market, by assuming that consumers have 
different, unobserved types characterizing their time discount rates (or their risk preference).  
At equilibrium, consumers with different types will borrow different amounts of loans. As a 
result, the probability of default is a function of the parameter that characterizes the types 
(for example, time preference or risk aversion parameter). In other words, the unconditional 
probability of default is a function of the types, and it can be written as the sum of the 
conditional probabilities corresponding to each type. Therefore, ignoring the types would 
lead to biased estimates of the marginal effect of observed characteristics. Accordingly, this 
paper proposes a mixture density econometric model that can be used to estimate 
simultaneously the distribution of the types and the conditional probabilities of default.   
Second, this paper estimates the empirical model using individual-level consumer 
credit information. We find that there are unobserved types in the population, and that 
having types in the model produces better out-of-sample predictions of the default 
probabilities.  Hence, this paper shows that this econometric model, that takes into account 
the existence of unobserved types, improves upon traditional credit scoring models.  
Using mixture densities to empirically model unobserved types is not new in the 
literature. For instance, Stahl and Wilson (1994) assume that individuals can be classified 
into different rational archetypes. Some choose strategies randomly, while others can figure 
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density model on a set of experimental data, and find evidence supporting the existence the 
types.  On a distinct field, Feinstein (1990) proposes and estimates a mixture density model 
that considers simultaneously the unobserved violations and the observed detections of 
violations of laws and regulations. Helland (1998) applies Feinsten’s method in studying 
the effect of pollution control laws. More recently, Knittel and Stango (2003) estimate a 
mixture density model using state-mandated price ceilings as focal points for unobserved 
tacit collusions of credit card companies.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives an equilibrium 
model of consumer credit cards with unobserved consumer types, and proposes an 
econometric method to identify the types. Section 3 applies the econometric model to 
individual-level data of a consumer credit market, and empirically tests the significance of 
the types previously defined. It also briefly discusses the application of this model to credit 
scoring, and shows how this model improves upon models that are only driven by statistical 
predictability. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. An Equilibrium Model of Consumer Credit Markets  
 
This theoretical model is based on the work of Jaffee and Russell (1976), and of 
Milde and Riley (1988). These papers focus on type identification by characterizing the 
theoretical conditions for the existence of separating equilibrium credit bundles. 
Nonetheless, in this research we intend to describe the economic effects on consumer credit 
of the existence of different types in the population, and how these effects motivate an 
empirical approach to test the significance of these types.  
In this model, there are two sets of participating agents: the applicants/borrowers 
and the issuer banks. We are interested in the potentially different types of borrowers in a 
population, as their distinct behavior leads to possibly diverse equilibrium actions. So we 
define Θ as the set of possible types of borrowers. Here it is assumed that there are two 
different types, so Θ ={θ1, θ2}. The borrower applies for a credit card. In his application, he 
discloses personal information (sex, age, income, number of children, credit history, etc), 
that potentially reveals his type, and may be useful in determining the probability of 
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interest rate and loan amount for the borrower in order to maximize its profit. Bierman and 
Hausman (1970) indicate that accurate estimations of the probability of default lead to an 
effective credit policy, in the sense that the amount of credit granted will not constrain sales 
and gains, nor it will allow increased losses due to uncollectible accounts. Thus, the 
probability of default is a critical variable for maximizing the bank’s profit. It is important 
to notice that in a credit card the loan amount really is a credit limit. The actual amount 
loaned may be lower than this limit. It depends on the preferences of the borrower. While 
the bank does not know to which type a particular borrower belongs, it may know that there 
is some probability that the borrower belongs to type θ1. From the economic theory about 
signals (see Spence, 1974), this probability is a function of the information revealed by the 
borrower. 
 
A. Indifference Curves for the Borrowers 
 
Following the setup of Milde and Riley (1988), we formulate a simple two-period 
consumption model to characterize the behavior of the borrowers. Let the intertemporal 
utility function U(c1, c2) be expressed as 
   () ( ) 2 1 2 1, c c V c c U θ α + =       (1) 
In this model   is assumed to be a concave function. Now, a first difference with 
Milde and Riley’s (1988) setup is the inclusion of time preference parameter α
() V ⋅
θ. For this 
analysis, we assume
2 that there are two types of borrowers depending on their 
intertemporal preference for consumption: those who give the same weight to future 
consumption as present consumption, that is
1 θ α  is normalized to be 1, and those who prefer 
present consumption, that is 1 0
2 < ≤ θ α . This assumption can easily be relaxed to admit the 
existence of a continuum of types defined by 1 0 ≤ ≤ θ α . Loosely speaking, one can say that 
there is a “responsible” type of borrower in the sense the he gives relatively more weight to 
                                                 
2 Actually this specification is robust to whatever characteristics the different types have; as long as those 
traits lead to different preference maps for each type. In the Appendix we solve for the case where the types 
represent different degrees of risk aversion. Since differences in both time and risk preferences can generate 
similar predictions, our empirical model cannot be used to distinguish the factors that define the unobserved 
types.  
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relatively more weight to the present, without worrying too much about the future.  
The budget constraint is expressed in terms of consumption in the two periods. The 
borrower uses amount L of his credit limit in the first period, hence his first-period 
consumption is c1 = y1 + L.  Loan L must be repaid in the second period, so the second-
period consumption is defined as 
     [ ] 0 , ) 1 ( max 2 2 L r y c + − = ,     (2) 
where the minimum consumption level for survival (or guaranteed by some law) is 
normalized to zero. The second-period income y2 is random, but we do not make Milde and 
Riley’s (1988) assumption that individuals differ in their expected second period income; 
hence, they define the types of borrowers as those with a high expected income, and those 
with a low expected income. In this research we assume that the randomness of second 
period income comes from exogenous shocks to the borrower, and thus it is independent of 
the borrower’s type, αθ.  
 Let  D be a random variable describing whether a borrower defaults or not. D = 1 if 
the borrower defaults; otherwise, D = 0. From equation (2), D = 1 if c2 = 0 or 
   D = 1 if y2 – (1+r) L ≤ 0.           (3) 
With this setup, for a given value of the utility function, say U(c1,c2) = U, one can 
use the implicit function theorem to determine the shape of the indifference curves in a 
given space. In this research we are interested in the space spawned by the loan amount L 
and the interest rate, expressed in terms of R=1+r. We restate equation (1) introducing the 
budget constraint: 
  
() [ ] ()
() ( ) ( ∫
∞
− + + =
− + =
RL
y dF RL y L y V
RL y L y U c c U
2 2 1
2 1 2 1 0 , max , ,
θ α )
    (4)   
Borrowers maximize this utility function to determine the optimal amount of loan L 
they demand. For a given interest rate R, the first order condition (FOC) for utility 
maximization is: 




s s RL F R L y V θ θ θ α − = + ,     (5) 
where   is the optimal loan for a given interest rate R.  
*
s Lθ
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utility in (4). Applying the implicit function theorem to (4), we have: 
() ( ) () [] ( ) ( )dR RL F L dL RL F R L y V − = − − + 1 1 ' 1 θ θ α α    (6) 
Rewriting (6), we have 
() ( ) ( )
() () RL F L












     (7) 
The numerator is the FOC of utility maximization of (4) for a given interest rate R. 
When , the numerator of (7) is zero, we have that dR/dL=0, which means that the 
indifference curves’ slope has a turning point at . To determine the sign of the slope 
for , let’s consider the second derivative with respect to L: 
*
s L L θ =
*
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*
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   (8) 
As stated before, dR/dL=0 if and only if . This implies that at point , 
d
*




2<0 which means that the indifference curve is at a maximum. Then, the concavity 
of V(·) allows one to conclude that 
(a) For , 
*
s L L θ > () ( ) ( ) 0 / 1 ' 1 < ⇒ − < + dL dR RL F R L y V θ α ; and,  
(b) For , 
*
s L L θ < () ( ) ( ) 0 / 1 ' 1 > ⇒ − > + dL dR RL F R L y V θ α . 
To evaluate the effect of αθ we differentiate dR/dL with respect to αθ: 















θ θ α α
. 
Both the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive for any L. Then, a 
higher value of αθ implies a lower marginal willingness to accept increments in the interest 
rate. This means that the marginal willingness to accept an increase in the interest rate is 
greater for type θ2 individuals, with higher preference for present consumption (lower αθ), 
than for type θ1 individuals. Graphically this relationship is showed in Figure 1.  
 
B. Iso-Profit Curve of the Bank and Market Equilibria 
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cost of lending (including opportunity costs). Since there is the possibility of default, the 
bank actually maximizes its expected profit. From equation (3), for a given level of R and L, 
the probability of default is F(RL).  The expected profit function is 
E(π) = Pr(D = 0) RL – (1+i) L       
          = (1- F(RL)) RL – (1+i)L      (9) 
In a competitive market setup, the expected economic profit is bound to be zero. 
Thus, we derive the iso-profit curve for E(π) = 0. Similarly to the borrower’s indifference 
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     (10) 
The second equality is obtained by applying E(π) = 0 to the numerator, which is 
strictly positive. Now, it is easy to see that the numerator is strictly positive, so the sign of 
(10) depends only on the sign of the denominator; which in turn depends on the difference 
between the probability of payment, 1-F(RL), and RLf(RL). Thus, the sign of the 
denominator depends on the characteristics of F(·), the distribution of second period income.   
If F(·) is an unimodal distribution, then dR/dL will be positive and increasing up to a 
turning point, RL, where  / dR dL = ∞. After this point, dR/dL will be negative, and the iso-
profit curve turns back to the left.  With this characterization of the behavior of both 
borrowers and banks, one can analyze the equilibrium in the consumer credit market via 
credit cards. 
Figure 2 presents the equilibrium analysis for credit card loans. The bank defines a 
credit limit LCL
4, and offers a continuum menu of loan amounts, such that . The 
borrower uses the supplied credit up to point where one of his indifference curves is tangent 
to the zero iso-profit curve. As showed above, the shape of the indifference curves is 
affected by the type of the individual. Therefore, type θ
[ CL
S L L , 0 ∈ ]
                                                
2 individuals, with a higher 
 
3 This result comes directly from applying the implicit function theorem to equation (9). 
4 The credit limit is defined by the total amount of funds available to loan, capital requirements and other 
regulations. 
  7preference for present consumption (lower αθ
1
2 s
), have a higher equilibrium loan and interest 
rate than type θ  individuals. It is important to notice that for each type the other’s 
equilibrium bundle lies in a lower utility indifference curve. In other words, neither type 
has an incentive to switch to the other’s equilibrium bundle.  Hence, we recover Milde and 
Riley (1988)’s result that one can identify the type of the individual after he chooses the 
amount of credit he wants to use.  For two otherwise identical individuals, the one that uses 
the highest amount of credit belongs to type θ . The equilibrium loan amount for type θ , 
denoted as , is typically different from the optimal amount of loan  in (5), since   is 









Now, suppose that there is some legislation that fixes the interest rate, or that the 
bank does not charge differential interest rates based on the loan amount. The constant rate 
R has to be greater than 1+i, otherwise the bank will not participate in the market. As 
showed in Figure 3, the same conclusions as in the unregulated case apply. The only 
difference is that the equilibrium amounts of loan will be the optimal amounts of loan that 
maximize the borrower’s utility given R  for each type. 
 
C. Equilibrium Default Rates and the Empirical Model 
 
In this setup, the probability of default depends on the type of each individual. We 
let αθ be a random variable with a Bernoulli distribution such that Pr(αθ=θ1) = p and 
Pr(αθ=θ2) = 1-p. When αθ =θs, the conditional probability of default is given by 
   () ( ) ( )
e e e e
s s s s s L R F L R y D θ θ θ θ θ θ α = ≤ − = = = 0 Pr | 1 Pr 2 ,   (11) 






θ (i.e. the type of a person), first period income y1, and second period income 
equation (2) through the cumulative distribution function F(·). In the case of a constant 




θ, y1, and F(·). Let X be a random vector of the observable characteristics of individuals 
that may affect probability of default. A simple way to approximate 
s s
ee RL θ θ  is 
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e e X y L R
s s β α θ θ + ≈ 1 . Therefore, ( ) ( 1 ss
ee ) s s FRL F y X θθ α β ≈+  and the unconditional 
probability of default can be written as: 
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      (12) 
Similarly,  
  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Pr β α β α X y F p X y F p D + − − + + − = = . 
Empirically, we can let  1 Pr( ) p θ α θ = =  be a function of a set of individual 
characteristics Zi, i.e.,  1 Pr( ) ( ) i GZ θ α θ == γ
)
)
. The likelihood function of the model is: 
                     (13)  () ( ) () () ( []
( ) () ( ) () () ( [] 2 2 1 1 1
1
2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 ln 1
1 ln
β α γ β α γ
β α γ β α γ
i i i i i
n
i
i i i i i
X y F Z G X y F Z G D
X y F Z G X y F Z G D L
+ − − + − −
+ + − + + =∑
=
  Since the model in (13) incorporates the unobserved types into the model, we refer 
this model as the type-consistent model.  
Feinstein (1990) discusses the identification issues related to this type of models. He 
argues that these models are basically identified via the functional form. Especially, if the 
same continuous variables appear in both Z and X, the coefficients β and γ may not be 
identifiable. To avoid this problem, we include in Z only socio-demographic variables, such 
as gender, age, and marital status; while X only includes economic variables such as income, 
measures of wealth, and credit history. This distinction follows from signaling theory as 
personal characteristics may reveal the individual’s type. Nevertheless, it is somewhat 
arbitrary which variables should be included in Z or X.  In the next section, we estimate the 
model using individual-level credit information. 
 
3. An Empirical Study of the Default Probability 
 
A.  The Data 
This research uses the information of all main cardholders of a major credit card 
issuer bank from Ecuador as of February 2006. This data set comprises information of the 
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individual, some economic variables, and the credit worthiness of each individual.  
One cannot simply use the fact that if an individual is late in his payment to classify 
each person into two groups: default or not default.  Being late in payment may simply 
indicate that the card holder has forgotten to pay. Thus, it is necessary to define how many 
days of not payment signify that the cardholder has opted to default. Ecuadorian law states 
that if a consumer credit account is in arrays for 90 or more days, then full provisions must 
be made and legal collection action must be taken. Therefore, if an individual is in default 
for 90 days or more, it is a clear sign that he has chosen to default.  For this study, clients 
that not default will be those who are not in default, or those who are in default for less than 
90 days (92.5% of the sample). Clients in default will be those in default for 90 or more 
days (7.5% of the sample).  
The data set was randomly partitioned into a design sample (60% of the 
observations) used to estimate the model, and a test sample (40% of the observations) for 
further analysis. Both samples maintain the population proportions of default and not 
default actions.  For the estimation of the model, Zi will comprise variables that represent 
only individual socio-demographic characteristics. Xi will include income, variables proxy 
for the wealth of each individual, a set of indicator variables that represent if the 
individual’s residence is in one of the nine largest cities of Ecuador, and credit worthiness 
indicators in the form of ratings provided by “Superintendecia de Bancos”, the government 
agency that oversees the operations of financial institutions in Ecuador.  A description of 
these variables is provided in table 1. 
The data for estimating default probabilities should come from a random sample of 
all historic applicants (accepted and rejected). However, it is often only possible to identify 
defaults and not defaults in the clients who were accepted. Therefore, usually there is a bias 
in the data generating process for these models that reflects the procedures used to 
accept/reject applicants. The estimators will echo this bias, and it is not possible to 
determine its direction (Capon, 1982). In this case we have that this particular bank has a 
very lenient applicant acceptance procedure. It basically relies on confirmation of the 
information presented in the application form (especially the reported income), and on 
requesting a guarantor for those cases where the assigned credit officer believes there is a 
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the rejection rate is negligible, and any bias in the data set will be minimal. 
 
B.  Specification Test and the Estimation Results 
For identification reason, we let Z be different from X. More specifically, Z is not a 
subset of X, nor is X is a subset of Z. Therefore, the type-consistent model does not nest the 
logit model. A specification test of the two models requires a non-nested procedure. 
Consider the following likelihood function: 
  ( ) consistent type it nested non L a aL L − − − + = 1 log ,     (14) 
where the likelihood Llogit represents the standard likelihood function of a logit model, and 
the likelihood Ltype-consistent is given in equation (13). The nesting parameter, , tests 
which model is correct. If a = 0, then the type-consistent model is supported; when a =1, 
the logit model is supported. To estimate the type-consistent model, we approximate G(·) 
and F(·) in the likelihood function (13) with a logistic
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ a
5 CDF. Our estimation of (14) finds 
that a = 0.0001 with a large standard error. Therefore, this non-nested test supports the 
type-consistent model stated in equation (13). From table 2, the likelihood for the logit 
model is -4028.95 while the likelihood for the type-consistent model is -3644.29. Given the 
results of the non-nested test, it is not surprising to see that the type-consistent model has a 
much higher likelihood value than the logit model.   
On average, the probability of default conditional on αθ = θ1 (6.5%) is lower than 
the probability of default conditional on αθ = θ2 (12.63%). These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that one of the types is more “responsible” than the other. Consider first the 
coefficients for the probability of type θ1. Of all the socio-demographic variables included 
in Z to describe this probability, only age is statistically significant. Additionally, there is 
evidence that age has a quadratic effect over the type probability. This result indicates that 
older people have a higher probability of belonging to type θ1, but this effect decreases as 
age increases. Looking back to the theoretical characterization of the types, in the context 
of either the time preference or the risk aversion definitions of the types, this result implies 
that older people tend to belong more to the “responsible” type than younger people. In 
addition, it is worthwhile to note that neither gender nor marital status is statistically 
                                                 
5 We also estimated the model using a normal CDF and recovered the main results. 
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include information regarding the level of education of the cardholder. Signaling theory 
argues that a person’s education could carry important signal about his type in a series of 
economic setups. It would have been interesting to test education’s signaling power in the 
credit market. 
In terms of the conditional probabilities of default, it is important to notice that 
parameter estimates are different for each type of consumers. For example, for the 
parameter that Times rated C past 3 months, the coefficient for type θ2 consumer is 17.19 
(5.61) while the coefficient for type θ1 consumer is only 0.217 (.107)
6. It is also true that 
some parameters are statistically significant for one type of consumers but not for the other 
type. Another important observation is that the parameter estimates from the simple logit 
model are different from both type θ1 and type θ2 coefficients. Therefore, this result 
indicates that different types of consumers do behave differently, as predicted by the 
theoretical model.  
In terms of marginal effects, we present two examples to illustrate the differences 
between the two models.  In the first example, we consider an increase of 10 years for a 
person at age 20, while everything else is taken at their respective sample mean. For the 
type-consistent model, the probability that the person belongs to type θ1 increases by 0.034 
and the overall probability of default decreases by 0.00130. However, this change based on 
logit model causes the default probability to increase by 0.000888. In the second example, 
we consider an increase in 1 in the number of times a person is rated E in the past three 
months, while taking everything else at their mean. For the type-consistent model, the 
probability of default increases by 0.1573. For the logit model, the probability of default 
increases by 0.0823. In both examples, the two models produce significantly different 
marginal effects.  
In the next section, we will show that modeling types in the probability of default 
yields better out-of-sample predictions of the probability of default. 
 
C. An Application to Credit Scoring 
 
                                                 
6 Standard errors showed in parenthesis. 
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provides the theoretical structure for a credit scoring model. Typically, credit card scoring 
models are derived only from statistical considerations; with the sole objective of achieving 
greater levels of predictability of the probability of default. Our model provides an 
economic structure that considers the estimation of the probability of default within an 
equilibrium setup and unobserved consumer types. As it will be showed, this allows us to 
define a credit scoring system that improves on traditional techniques. Thus, we verify the 
existence of types in the credit market in the sense that a model that includes types in its 
specification produces better out-of-sample predictions of the probability of default.   
Even though credit scoring systems are commonly employed by banks and retail 
companies, one can not find in the published literature much investigation on the subject, 
especially on specific estimation techniques. Hand and Henley (1997) argue that this is a 
consequence of the confidentiality lenders maintain on their data and procedures due to 
security issues and the competitive advantage given by more accurate estimation 
techniques. The estimation of the probability of default relies on techniques such as 
discriminant analysis, linear regression, logistic regression, decision trees, expert systems, 
neural networks, and dynamic programming. Hand and Henley (1997), Rosenberg and 
Gleit (1994), and Reichert, Cho and Wagner (1983) give a succinct description of these 
techniques. Wiginton (1980) presents one of the first uses of the logistic regression in credit 
scoring. His results show that the logit model predictability dominates the linear 
discriminant results.  In the nonparametric field, Hand and Henley (1996) derive a k- 
nearest neighbor estimator for estimating the probability of default. In addition, Zhu, Beling 
and Overstreet (2001) build on the notion of second order stochastic dominance to 
determine the conditions where combining two credit scores leads to a better model in the 
sense that it estimates probabilities of default more accurately than its components.  
We use the logit model for the probability of default to contrast the out of sample 
performance of the type-consistent model. Logit models are commonly used in the credit 
industry, so they are a well known benchmark. Several simple statistics and the Lorenz 
curve will be used to compare the models. Of course, any validation of the predictive power 
of the model must be assessed out of sample, so in what follows we use the test sample. 
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Table 2 reports the within sample pseudo R
2 for the type-consistent model and the 
logit model. The pseudo-R
2 = 0.8047 for the type-consistent model, higher than the pseudo- 
R
2 = 0.7841 for the logit model. Since we have more than 60,000 observations in the 
estimation sample, the (degrees of freedom) adjusted pseudo-R
2 changes little: the type 
consistent model still has a higher pseudo-R
2 than the logit model. However, for the within-
sample average default probabilities, the logit model (0.075119) is closer to the observed 
default probability (0.075120) than the type-consistent model (0.07506).  
In table 3, we calculate out-of-sample statistics for the mean of the probabilities of 
default, pseudo-R
2, adjusted pseudo-R
2, and the mean squared prediction errors for both 
models. The type-consistent model produces a mean default probability closer to the 
observed sample mean, a higher pseudo-R
2, a higher adjusted pseudo-R
2, and a lower mean 
squared prediction error than the logit model. Therefore, there is evidence that a model that 
includes types in its specification produces better out-of-sample predictions of the 
probability of default. 
 
(2) Lorenz Curves 
Before further comparing the models, it is necessary to establish how the probability 
of default will be computed using the type–consistent model. In practice the bank can use 
the computed unconditional probability of default, or either the conditional probability of 
default for type θ1 and the conditional probability of default for type θ2, depending on each 
individual’s probability of being of type θ1. Thus, different mixtures for estimating the 
probability of default can be employed. For a credit card issuer, it is important to minimize 
the number of “default” (“bad” clients) classified by the model as “not default” (“good” 
clients), as issuers tend to not reject those applicants with high probabilities of default, but 
to reduce their credit limit. Taking into account this fact, this research compares two 
different alternatives with the results of the logit model:  
(i)  A “naïve” approach that only uses the unconditional probability of default from 
the type-consistent model such that: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 Pr β α γ β α γ i i i i i i i X y F Z G X y F Z G D + − + + = =   
  14(ii) A “risk averse” approach based on the distribution of the estimated probability 
of type θ1 for each individual, to minimize the number of “bad” clients 
classified by the model as “good”.  
()
()
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The bounds are the upper quantile and the mean of the distribution of the estimated 
probability of type θ1 at a 95% confidence level. 
Typically, the performance of a credit score model is to evaluate the number of 
“bad” clients the model rates as “good” (Type II error) and the number of “good” clients 
the model rates as “bad” (Type I error), for a specific probability of default cut off value. 
This value should be determined to maximize profit, or relative to a particular approval 
policy if any exists. In the absence of these criteria, one can calculate the proportion of 
“good” and “bad” clients accepted by the model for a series of probability of default cut off 
values. Then one can plot the proportion of “good” clients rejected and the proportion of 
“bad” clients accepted against the cut off values forming Lorenz curves (see Figure 4 and 
Figure 5). The perfect model would the lower and right axes for both “good” and “bad” 
applicants. The area between the curves and the axes is used as a measure of the model’s 
discriminatory power (Hand and Henley, 1997).  
As stated before, for the credit card industry, the main interest is to identify the 
“bad” clients in the application process. Extending this idea, this is so because the amount 
of credit extended and the interest rate can be defined to take into account the level of risk 
of each individual (see Section 2). Therefore, in practice a “bad” applicant will not be 
rejected (unless his or her risk level is really high), but will receive a lower credit limit. For 
“good” applicants identified as “bad” this poses a minor inconvenience, since is common to 
periodically adjust (increase) the credit limit granted according to consumption and 
payment behavior. Thus, this research will focus on comparing the performance of the type 
model versus the logit model regarding the identification of “bad” applicants.  The relevant 
Lorenz curves for the three cases are in Figure 4.  
The “risk averse” approach yields a smaller proportion of “bad” clients accepted 
than the logit or the “naïve” approach for practically the entire range of probability of 
  15default cut off values. This means that the bank will do better using the “risk averse” 
approach for any acceptance rule. Also, the “naïve” model outperforms the logit for cut off 
values lower then 0.25. This means that if the banks automatically accepts all clients with a 
probability of default of 0.25 or lower, it will do better using the “naïve” model than the 
logit. These results indicate that the type-consistent model identifies more accurately the 
“bad” from the “good”.  This is a consequence of identifying the type of each client in a 
probabilistic sense.  
 For the “good” clients (Figure 5), obviously the performance of the “risk averse” 
approach is lower than both the logit model and the “naïve” approach, since this approach 
was designed to detect the “bad” clients without considering the effect on the “good” ones. 
However, its acceptance rate of “good” clients is over 90% for practically the whole range. 
On the other hand, the “naïve” approach (which is neutral between “good” and “bad”) 
performs better than the logit model for cut off values of 0.26 and larger. This indicates that 
we could find a mixture similar to the “risk averse” approach, only that it would minimize 
rejection of “good” clients”. All this indicates that a model that includes types in its 
specification produces better out-of-sample predictions, and in this sense confirms the 
existence of types in the population. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper builds up an equilibrium model of consumer credit markets. The model 
has two types of consumers, one with a higher time discount rate than the other. Although 
the types are unobserved, different types of consumers will choose different equilibrium 
amount of loan. As a result, the probability of default depends on the type of each 
individual. Subsequently, the paper derives an econometric model for the probability of 
default that incorporates the unobserved types. Hence, the choice of defaulting, viewed as a 
random variable, has a mixture density.  
The paper then applies the model to the consumer credit market to test the existence 
of two types of applicants: those individuals who are naturally inclined to fulfill their credit 
obligations (the “responsible” type), and those individuals who are naturally inclined to 
default (the “irresponsible” type). We find that including types in the model for the 
probability of default leads to better out of sample predictions. In this sense, the paper tests 
  16and confirms the existence of types in the population. An interesting result is that older 
people have a higher chance of belonging to the “responsible” type than younger, while 
gender statistically has no effect in determining the type of a person. This indicates that 
responsibility is not part of the genetic code, but is a consequence of the experiences a 
person has in his life. Unfortunately, the data available does not include variables that carry 
information about a person’s experiences (for example, education, type of work, travels to 
foreign countries, etc.). It would be interesting to analyze which factors lead to higher 




Unobserved Types in Terms of Risk Aversion 
Now we assume that there are two types of borrowers: those high risk aversion and 
those with low risk aversion. To introduce risk aversion in the model, we explicitly define 
V(·) as a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion coefficient αθ. 
In this context type θ1 individuals have a higher coefficient αθ than type θ2 
individuals. The two-period utility function is restated as: 
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  17Thus the amount of loan demanded is lower for those individual with higher risk 
aversion. One can also use the implicit function theorem to derive the form of the 
indifference curves. 
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dR/dL is zero if and only if   . To determine the sign of the slope for  , 
let’s consider the second derivative with respect to L: 
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dR/dL = 0 if and only if  . This implies that at point  , d
*




2 < 0, which 
means that the indifference curve is at a maximum. Then, the concavity of V(·) allows one 
to conclude that: 
(a) For  : ()
*
s L L θ > ( ) ( ) 0 / 1 1 < ⇒ − < +
− − dL dR RL F RA L y
θ θ α
θ
α α ; and,  
(b) For  :()
*
s L L θ < ( ) ( ) 0 / 1 1 > ⇒ − > +
− − dL dR RL F RA L y
θ θ α
θ
α α . 
To evaluate the effect of αθ, we take the second derivative with respect to αθ: 
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     ( A 6 )  
Recall that , which means that it is the expected second 
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•  E(c2) < y1 + L = c1, in this case, d
2R/dLdαθ < 0 so type θ1 individuals, with a 
higher coefficient αθ, have a lower marginal willingness to accept increases in R 
than type θ2 individuals. This implies the same results as developed in Section 2. 
•   E(c2) > y1 + L = c1, in this case d
2R/dLdαθ > 0, thus type θ1 individuals, with a 
higher coefficient αθ, have a higher marginal willingness to accept increases in R 
than type θ2 individuals. This implies that still one can find differences in the 
  18preference map between the two types, but in this case type θ1 individuals will 
have a higher equilibrium loan amount. 
•   E(c2) = y1 + L = c1, in this case the expected second period consumption is the 
same as the first period consumption. Now, d
2R/dLdαθ = 0 and the existence of 
different types has no effect on the preference maps. Thus, the results in Section 
2 would not hold. 
In conclusion, as long as expected second period consumption is different from the 
first period consumption, the existence of types, defined in terms or different degrees of 
risk aversion, will differentiate the preference map of type θ1 individuals from the 
preference map of type θ2 individuals. In turn, these differences will lead to different 
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Table 1: Description of the Variables 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Default  1 if in default for 90 or more days.  0.08  0.26  0  1 
Sex  1 if women, 0 if men.  0.36 0.48  0  1 
Number of 
Children 
The number of persons the client is 
financially responsible for. 
1.14 1.30  0  12 
Age  Age of the client measured in years.  46.57  11.68  20  95 
Single 0.19  0.40  0  1 
Married 0.72  0.45  0  1 
Widow 0.02  0.14  0  1 
Marital Status 
Divorced 0.06  0.24  0  1 
Income  Monthly income (in US$)  1982.98 1997.63  100  65000 
Vehicles   Number of vehicles  1.08  0.69  0  21 
Properties  Number of properties (houses, 
apartments, or offices) the client has.   1.23 0.76  0  10 
# of cell phones  # of cell phones.  0.93  0.89  0  3 
Cell Phone  1 when the client has a cell phone.   0.66  0.47  0  1 
Cell Phone and 
Telephone 
1 if has a land line phone and a cell 
phone.  0.57 0.50  0  1 
Times rated A  2.49  0.94  0  3 
Times rated B  0.18  0.47  0  3 
Times rated C  0.06  0.29  0  3 
Times rated D  0.02  0.16  0  3 
Times rated E 
Credit ratings of each individual in other 
financial institutions. For each category 
(A, B, C, D or E), the number of times 
rated in each category for the last three 
months (from 0 to 3).  0.17 0.67  0  3 
City 1  0.48  0.50  0  1 
City 2  0.23  0.42  0  1 
City 3  0.07  0.26  0  1 
City 4  0.03  0.17  0  1 
City 5  0.01  0.10  0  1 
City 6  0.01  0.08  0  1 
City 7  0.02  0.13  0  1 
City 8  0.02  0.13  0  1 
City dummies 
City 9  0.03  0.16  0  1 
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Table 2 - Estimation Results 
 
Variable Logit Model Type-Consistent Model 
   Probability of  Default Prob Default Prob 
 T ype θ1 Type θ1 Type θ2
Sex -0.0847 -0.0885 - - 
Sex  (0.0723)
(a) (0.1025) --  
Number of children  -0.0176 0.0135 - - 
Number of children  (0.0287) (0.0413) --  
Age 0.0206 0.0482** - - 
Age  (0.0208) (0.0199) --  
Square Age -0.000186 -0.000522** - - 
Square Age  (0.000208) (0.000205) --  
Single 0.2494 0.7446 - - 
Single  (0.4852) (0.4704) --  
Married 0.3713 0.5668 - - 
Married  (0.4786) (0.4746) --  
Widower 0.5106 0.3620 - - 
Widower  (0.5286) (0.5551) --  
Divorced 0.3708 0.6071 - - 
Divorced  (0.4936) (0.5114) --  
Income -0.000030 - -0.000024 0.000047
Income  (0.0000199) - (0.000039) (0.000054)
Number of vehicles  -0.0997** - -0.1316 0.0361 
Number of vehicles  (0.0505) - (0.0939) (0.2742)
Properties 0.0632 - -0.1093 0.6648**
Properties  (0.0482) - (0.0884) (0.1943)
Number of cell phones 0.4204** - 0.5415** 0.6955 
Number of cell phones  (0.1449) - (0.2452) (0.5767)
Has Cell phone -1.1601** - -1.3903* -2.1888 
Has Cell phone  (0.4094) - (0.7144) (1.7014)
Has Land line and cell phone 0.6054** - 0.6269 1.4854 
Has Land line and cell phone  (0.2626) - (0.4736) (1.1389)
Times rated A past 3 months  -0.9902** - -1.7841**  
(b)
Times rated A past 3 months  (0.0593) - (0.1351) - 
Times rated B past 3 months  0.1530** - -0.0945 1.0693 
Times rated B past 3 months  (0.0644) - (0.1078) (1.3951)
Times rated C past 3 months  1.0985** - 0.2170** 17.1934**
Times rated C past 3 months  (0.0653) - (0.1070) (5.6111)
Times rated D past 3 months  2.3029** - 2.1249** 30.2062 
Times rated D past 3 months  (0.0913) - (0.1184) (50.3460)
Times rated E past 3 months  2.3737** - 2.3192** 6.68673**
Times rated E past 3 months  (0.0693) - (0.1038) (1.7785)
City 1  -0.1316 - 0.0642 -0.9488*
City 1  (0.1157) - (0.2175) (0.5269)
City 2  0.1185 - 0.1258 0.2418 
City 2  (0.1224) - (0.2228) (0.4908)
City 3  -0.5254** - -0.8388** -1.4157 
City 3  (0.1811) - (0.3730) (0.9575)
City 4  -0.1676 - -0.1325 -0.7568 
City 4  (0.2245) - (0.4434) (1.1096)
City 5  -0.0562 - 1.5563** -33.6897
City 5  (0.3439) - (0.4210) (40.6929)
City 6  0.4841 - 1.1057* 0.6668 
City 6  (0.3323) - (0.6640) (1.2261)
  22City 7  -0.4859* - -0.0691 -5.4389 
City 7  (0.2842) - (0.4889) (10.0657)
City 8  0.4759* - 0.7500* -1.5327 
City 8  (0.2478) - (0.4356) (2.4561)
City 9  -0.0164 - 0.1838 -9.4377**
City 9  (0.2322) - (0.4341) (3.0267)
Constant -3.4030** - -2.0522** -5.9895 
Constant  (0.7110) - (0.3033) (4.1805)
Log Likelihood  -4028.95 -3644.29
Probability of Type θ1 83.4013%  





(a) Standard errors are in parentheses.  
      * Significant at 90% confidence level. ** Significant at 95% confidence level.  
(b) The unconstraint estimate of Times rated A has a very high standard deviation for type  






Table 3 Comparisons of Out-of-Sample Predictions 
 
   type-consistent 
model  logit model 
Mean Default Probabilities
* 0.07470 0.07455 
Pseudo-R
2 0.7912 0.7791 
Adjusted Psuedo-R
2 0.7911 0.7790 
Mean Squared Predicted Errors  0.0148  0.0153 
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FIGURE 2: Iso-profit Curve and the Indifference Curves
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